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Discursive Deracialisation in talk about Asylum Seeking 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore the extent to which 'discursive deracialisation', the removal of 'race' 
from potentially racially motivated arguments, is taking place in talk about asylum seeking. A 
discourse analysis is conducted on the part of a corpus of data collected from focus groups with 
undergraduate students talking about asylum seeking, in which they were asked if they 
considered it to be racist to oppose asylum. We show that speakers use three arguments for 
opposing asylum that are explicitly non-racist: opposition is based on (1) economic reasons (2) 
religious grounds and the associated threat of terrorism and (3) the lack of asylum seekers' 
ability to integrate into British society. These findings are discussed with regard to the 
implications they have for our understanding of discursive deracialisation in which it is shown 
that there is a common knowledge understanding, albeit one that needs qualifying, that 
opposition to asylum is not racist. 
Key words: Discursive Deracialisation, Asylum Seekers, Discursive Psychology, Prejudice, 
Racism 
Introduction 
Despite the continuing harsh treatment towards asylum seekers (e.g. Bloch & Schuster, 2005; 
Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Hynes & Sales, 2009; Leudar et al, 2008; Randall, 2003) there is an 
ongoing debate about whether or not such opposition to asylum seekers is racist. While a 
number of commentators and politicians maintain that opposition is not racist (e.g. the UK's 
Conservative party) other commentators (e.g. Hubbard, 2005) including discursive 
psychologists (Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2005) have argued that this opposition 
is in the very least prejudicial. Of particular interest is the finding that supporters of asylum 
seeking may not freely make accusations of racism without bringing about a negative appraisal 
(Goodman, in press; van Dijk, 1992, 1993). This current discursive analysis contributes to this 
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ongoing debate (Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Figgou & Condor, 2006) by addressing how 
undergraduate focus group participants respond to the question ‘is it racist to oppose asylum 
seeking?’ In particular we focus on cases where alternative explanations for racism are given 
for opposition to asylum seeking. 
Discursive psychology and prejudice: 
Throughout its history Discursive Psychology (henceforth DP) has been used to address 
prejudice and racism. Wetherell & Potter (1992) showed that talk does not need to be 
obviously racist or prejudicial to bring about and justify the prejudicial and oppressive 
treatment of particular groups. This is what discursive psychologists mean when they refer to 
the ‘action orientation’ of talk (Edwards & Potter, 1992) as it is what is achieved through talk, 
rather than what this talk tells us about people’s attitudes that is of interest in DP. Another key 
tenet of DP of prejudice is the existence of the ‘norm against prejudice’ (Billig, 1988, p.95) in 
which speakers can be seen going to rhetorical lengths not to be labelled as racist as this is a 
damaging subject position with which to be associated. DP has been used to show that to avoid 
being seen as prejudiced, or racist, people use disclaimers (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975, such as ‘I’m 
not prejudiced, but…’, Billig et al, 1988, p.112) to ensure that what they are saying is not taken 
as evidence of prejudice. 
One way of broadly disclaiming prejudice is what Augoustinos and Every describe as ‘Discursive 
Deracialisation’ (2007, p.133). This is where speakers try to ensure that their opposition to out-
groups is attributed to reasons other than race. This finding is supported by many analyses (e.g. 
Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008; Lynn & Lea, 2003). Augoustinos & Every (2007) suggest that this 
explains the increase in talk about ‘nationality’ (rather than race) in anti-immigration and 
asylum arguments. Coinciding with this ‘discursive deracialisation’ is the suggestion that in 
addition to the well established ‘norm against prejudice’ (Billig, 1988, p.95) that there is an 
increasing norm against making accusations of racism. van Dijk (1992) has shown how this 
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taboo against prejudice can be utilised by speakers to claim that majority groups are being 
discriminated against because they are not allowed to speak their mind. Goodman (in press) 
has shown how opponents of asylum (and immigration) take this a step further so as to present 
the norm against prejudice as an assault on free speech to the extent that making accusations 
of racism has become problematic for supporters of asylum.  
Another feature of discursive deracialisation is that instead of presenting opposition to out-
groups as in any way prejudicial, speakers present alternative explanations that draw upon 
reasonableness to explain their opposition. This is to be expected considering Edward’s claim 
that ‘any kind of prejudice is tantamount to irrationality’ (2003, p.40, emphasis in original) and 
that people will not want to appear irrational. Capdevila & Callaghan (2008) have shown this to 
be a key feature of the UK's Conservative party's anti asylum and immigration campaign in 
which they explicitly claimed that their opposition to asylum was not racist, but was common 
sense. They also show how the party's leader Michael Howard constructed himself as a 
reasonable (and therefore not racist) man. Another example of building such cases as 
reasonable, and so not racist, was identified by Augoustinos et al (1999) in which opposition to 
Aborigines in Australia was presented as due to (reasonable) opposition to the government 
favouring Aborigines over white Australians. 
This current analysis draws together a number of these themes by looking at the way in which 
student participants construct alternative, non-racist (discursively deracialised) and reasonable 
explanations for opposing asylum seekers when asked if it is racist to oppose asylum seeking. 
Procedure 
The data in this analysis is part of a corpus generated for an ongoing research project about 
how students talk about asylum. This project is distinct in that the data has been collected 
using focus groups with undergraduate students rather than from media or parliamentary data 
(e.g. Every & Augoustinos, 2007). Five focus groups were conducted with sixteen psychology 
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undergraduate students (fifteen female with a range of ethnic backgrounds, reflecting the 
makeup of the course) at a UK University between October 2008 and April 2009. The voluntary 
nature of participation, coupled with the distinct demographic of undergraduates does mean 
that this corpus may not be representative of the entire population, although a range of views 
and repertoires were displayed. The focus groups were led by the first author and covered a 
range of issues relating to asylum seeking, however this analysis was conducted on only the 
responses to the interviewer's question: ‘is it racist to oppose asylum seeking?’ This is because 
of an interest in what constitutes racism both generally (e.g. Figgou & Condor, 2006) and within 
the asylum debate (e.g. Every & Augoustinos, 2007). 
Focus group research has been shown to be ideal for generating interaction between 
participants (e.g. Puchta & Potter, 2004) which has been the case in this data corpus. Those 
who argue against 'contrived' data as a source of discursive analysis (e.g. Potter, 1997) claim 
that participants will be attending to the 'performance' of being in a focus group which may 
affect the data. However, as Speer (2002) has argued, a 'natural' and 'contrived' distinction 
may not exist because participants are always producing their own ('natural') accounts while 
attending to whatever ('contrived') social situation they are in, which in this case is a focus 
group. 
This research is part of the increasing body of (broadly critical) discursive psychological (e.g. 
Wetherell & Edley, 1999) analyses that have looked at talk (and texts) about asylum seekers, 
and in particular how their harsh treatment is justified (Every & Augoustinos, 2007, Goodman 
2007, 2008, in press, Goodman & Speer, 2007; Goodman & Burke, in press; Leudar et al., 2008; 
Lynn & Lea, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005). Such research focuses on the action orientation of talk 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) which means that our interest lies in what is accomplished in the 
interaction, rather than what talk may tell us about speakers' internal cognitions. 
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To conduct the analysis the data were transcribed according to Jeffersonian conventions 
(Atkinson and Heritage, 1984 pix-xvi). In this analysis the authors focused on cases in the data 
where participants offered alternatives to racism as an explanation of opposition to asylum 
seeking. The extracts featured were chosen as exemplars of the strategies indentified in the 
analysis. 
Analysis 
We have identified three strategies that were used in the focus groups to represent non-racist 
explanations for opposing asylum. The most prevalent was that opposition to asylum is due to 
economic reasons, however opposition was also attributed to religion and (a lack of) 
integration. Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
1. It’s not racist; it’s about the economy 
In the following extracts we see examples of speakers arguing that economic reasons better 
explain opposition to asylum than racism does. Such arguments are usually made in a delicate 
way which suggests that participants orient to it as a matter that requires care. In this first 
extract, from FG3, we see P2 managing the dilemma caused by posing the question ‘is it racist 
to oppose asylum seeking?’ by first suggesting how it can be racist before settling on non-racist 
economic reasons. 
Extract 1: FG3 Financial bit, living off us 
1. P2:   [sorry erm]  >I was j- gonna say< ‘cause you are oppo:sing 
2.    foreigners 
3. SG:  yeah 
4. P2:   and if you sort of hate em >due to the fact that-< of their nationality: (.) 
5.    ra:ce (.) skin colour >all the rest of< i::t (0.3) then that is being raci::st 
7 
 
6. SG:  okay 
7. P2:   if you just h- (0.4) oppose the who:l:e (0.6) asylum seeking system >s- in 
8.    the (sense) that< (0.5) oh::  (.) they’re living off us 
9. SG:  hmm: 
10. P2:   >in the sense that< it’s all basic- (.) on (0.4) based around (0.8) the whole 
11.    financial bit of it  
12. SG:  yeah? 
13. P2:   =then ↑I suppose that’s not really being raci:st [you]’re just saying  
14. SG:                    [okay:]  
15. P2:   y’know (.) they’re living off us  
In the first half of this extract P2 puts forward a definition of what does count as racist. This is 
brought about through the listing of characteristics on which racism is based (1:5). This lay 
representation of racism is explicitly attributed to hating people from different (ethnic) 
backgrounds (see Figgou & Condor, 2006). This construction of opposition to asylum as racist is 
then contrasted (Atkinson, 1984) with a non racist explanation, directly following the 
interviewer’s continuer (1:6). Here, rather than opposing individual asylum seekers the 
opposition is now constructed as being directed at the system (1:7). Notice the use of ‘just’ 
(1:7) which has been shown to downgrade and criticise what is being said (Goodman & Burke, 
in press). This position, which is based on an economic argument that asylum seekers do not 
pay their way (e.g. Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003, which is associated with the 
idea of the ‘economic migrant’, see Laytonn-Henry, 1992; Steiner, 2000) is placed as outside of 
the speaker. This can be seen through the use of ‘oh’ which has been shown to highlight 
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reported speech (Myers, 1999). By showing that this idea is not her own, P2 is able to 
dissociate herself from this position which suggests that P2 is orienting to this position as being 
a potentially damaging one. This shows the dilemmatic nature (e.g. Billig et al, 1988) of the 
issue with P2 hedging so as not to align with either the position that it is, or is not, racist to 
oppose asylum, while pointing out the flaws of both positions. 
The use of ‘I suppose’ (1:13) does suggest that on the basis of the two sides of the argument P2 
has reasonably concluded, albeit rather tentatively, that it is not racist to oppose asylum 
seeking given the economic burden (‘living off us’ (1:15)) that they cause British people to 
endure. The use of ‘y’know’ (1:15) is an appeal to common knowledge (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). Nevertheless, this non-racist reason for opposing asylum seeking is still not taken up as 
the speaker's own view as P2 is speaking on behalf of others (you’re just saying 1: 13) rather 
than herself. This is of interest because even though P2 is not claiming this position as her own, 
she is still going to some rhetorical length to disclaim racism on behalf of others (Condor et al, 
2006). 
In the following extract we see a similar structure used. It begins with an acknowledgment of 
how opposition to asylum may be racist and ends with the speaker suggesting that this 
opposition is most likely due to non racist – economic – reasons. 
Extract 2: FG4 Lack of jobs, slums and all that 
1. P1:            [ye:s]       (.) yeah ye:s because: (0.6) the people: (.) that are getting 
2.    deni:ed or .hh >the people that you’re opposing< are different race to you 
3.    .hh so you can put in the context of o:h you don’t wa:nt that certain race 
4.    (.) .hh here for whatever reason .hh but then no: because: (1.0) the 
5.    reasons why: (0.8) th- m- like people oppose asylum .hh is not 
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6.    necessarily down to (.) the colour r- they are it’s the (.) .hh the 
7.    consequences of them coming over sort of like .hh l:ack of jo::bs: an:: 
8.    you know slum:s being: develo↑ped and all that .hh s:o (1.0) I think it’s (.) 
9.    I think it’s a mixture of both really I f- >I don’t think you can< put it o::n 
10.    (0.5) and say yeah it’s a racist thing (0.6) unle- unti:l: sort of prejudice 
11.    statements start being ma:de and (.) then it becomes about race .hh 
12.    but (0.6) >I don’t know< I think it’s ↑I think it’s a bit of bo:th to be honest 
13. SG:  right (.) okay 
14. P1:   =definite 
15. ?:  hmm 
16. (2.0) 
17. P2:   .hh yea:h I pretty much agree: (.) I think it (.) y- yeah (1.3) depends w:hat 
18.    they (.) what they (.) what the context is kind of 
19. P1:   yeah 
P1 begins this account by suggesting the ways in which opposing asylum seeking can be racist. 
This begins with a repeatedly emphasised ‘yes, yeah, yes’ (2:1) and a suggestion that opposing 
asylum seekers is a manifestation of opposing people from a different race, as in extract one. 
Again we see the use of ‘oh’ (1:3) to signal reported speech which distances the speaker from 
the views expressed. The contrast comes at line four (‘but then no’) when P1 switches to 
arguing the case that it is not racist to oppose asylum. The ‘no’ (1:4) is emphasised just as the 
earlier agreement was. Again the speaker dissociates her comments from those being 
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described (‘people oppose asylum’ 1:5) and so avoids aligning with either the position that it is 
– or is not – racist to oppose asylum seeking. 
The non-racist reasons for opposing asylum are constructed as the financial ‘consequences’ 
(2:7) of asylum. These are presented in a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) including (1) ‘lack of 
jobs’ (2:7) and (2) ‘slums being developed (2:8) and is concluded with a general ‘and all that’ 
(2:8). While the economic arguments are often cited in debates about asylum (Capdevila & 
Callaghan, 2008; Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003) one of the specific reasons 
offered here ‘the development of slums’ is more unusual. It is unclear exactly what is meant by 
this or where such an argument may have come from and suggests a lack of a sophisticated 
understanding of the asylum issue. 
P1 then struggles to align with either of the alternatives that have been offered, which can be 
seen through the pauses, elongation and repetition of words which suggest that this is a 
dispreferred response (Pomerantz, 1984). It is interesting that P1 says that for the opposing of 
asylum seekers to be considered racist there must be accompanying ‘prejudice statements’ 
(2:10/11) which suggests that opposition to asylum alone is not considered to be prejudicial 
(despite the arguments that the mistreatment of this group may well be prejudicial e.g. 
Hubbard, 2005). P1 then completes this hedging turn by claiming ignorance (‘I don’t know’ 
2:12) which again allows the speaker to avoid making a definite decision, and allows for the 
question to not be properly answered (‘it’s a bit of both’ 12:12). The use of ‘to be honest’ (2:12) 
highlights the contentious and dilemmatic nature of the question, as claims of honesty have 
been shown to be a feature of talk about contentious issues (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006). 
Next, P2 supports P1’s earlier comments. Again, however, the alignment with this position, 
which is itself a tentative one, is managed with delicacy that allows the speaker room to move 
from this position: this can be seen in the term ‘I pretty much agree’ (2:17) and the long pauses 
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throughout this brief statement. P1 then follows this with another token of agreement which 
shows that P1 and P2 are building this account together.  
In this final extract in the section we can see an extra element added to the discussion about 
economic reasons for opposing asylum. Here there is debate about the motivations of 
opponents of asylum based on their own ethnic status: suggesting that it is easier for people 
from ethnic minorities to oppose asylum seekers without being seen as racist. 
Extract 3: FG4 Economic reasons 
1.   P2:  wher::eas: (2.0) if (.) ↑you know you are part of av- (.) a minority then 
2.    (.) .hh (1.5) ↑the:n I think yeah people ar:: (.) are more (.) you can- 
3.    you can say it I think .hh 
4. SG:  °okay° 
5. P2:   but at the same time I think that (1.3) ↑I don’t know I think that if:: 
6.    >if a person< (.) from minority groups: does: (1.3) say e::: (1.3) 
7.    I don’t know (.) if they oppose kind of asylum seeking .hh ↑you think (0.2) 
8.    >I don’t know< it’s re:- it’s confusing ‘cause (2.3) y- it has to be (.) er I 
9.    think it’s taken more as in (0.2) okay (.) i:t’s like (.) econom- it must be 
10.    econ↑omic reas↓ons rather than 
11. SG:   right 
12. P2:   like (0.2) anything other -like any ra:cial issues 
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In many ways this extract follows a similar structure to those above. There is an explicit 
acknowledgment that this is a contentious and problematic question to answer directly (e.g. 
‘it’s confusing’ 3:8). The speaker then draws on the now commonly recognised repertoire of 
opposing asylum on economic grounds (as in extracts one and two).  Where this extract is 
different is the suggestion of another variable that influences whether or not opposition to 
asylum can be seen as either based on racism or economic reasons and this factor is the race of 
the opponent of asylum. It is suggested that people from minorities are more likely to be seen 
as opposing asylum for economic reasons whereas white people are more likely to be seen as 
opposing asylum for racial reasons. In this particular case it is implied that it is particularly 
difficult to oppose asylum without being seen as racist and that it is only members of ethnic 
minorities who are unlikely to be seen in this way. This argument is therefore implicitly critical 
of the ‘taboo against racism’ (Billig, 1988) which is presented as an assault of free speech 
(Goodman, in press). This can be seen in the emphasised comment that minorities ‘can’ (3:3) 
oppose racism without being seen as racist, which suggests that there is a lack of freedom for 
majority groups to be able to say what they want. 
As with the previous extracts a noticeable feature of this talk is the large amount of hedging 
and delicacy displayed. On lines one to three we can see a number of pauses (including two 
over a second long) and a cut off word (‘av’ 3:1). More evidence of the hedging going on here is 
in the repeated use of ‘I think’ (3: 2,3, 4, 4) which allows some space for the speaker to take 
back what is said. This suggests that the answer is a dispreferred response (Pomerantz, 1984) in 
that the presentation of the argument highlights the contentious nature of what is being said 
and the potentially negative appraisal that this can bring the speaker. Further evidence of the 
dilemmatic nature of this talk is the explicit claim that the issue is ‘confusing’ (3:8). While 
claiming to be confused could be seen as a negative self assessment to be made by a speaker, 
such a claim helps the speaker to maintain some distance from the (tentative) comments that 
are being made which means that in the event of being criticised for the comments they can 
13 
 
relatively easily be removed without the accountability (Edwards & Potter, 1992) of the 
speaker being seriously damaged. 
In this extract P2 avoids giving a personal opinion about the reasons that people oppose 
asylum seeking. The point is made that it is difficult for white people to make anti asylum 
arguments without being seen as racist, which implies that there are non-racist reasons for 
opposition. Economic reasons are posited as a likely explanation for minority groups’ 
opposition; however P2 offers no suggestion as to why people would use either argument, or 
the value of any such argument. This is different to the first two extracts in which the speaker 
aligns (to some extent) with both arguments as possible reasons for the opposition. 
These extracts have shown that while participants acknowledge that opposition to asylum may 
be racist, an alternative argument – that this opposition is down to economic reasons – is also 
offered and to some extent favoured over the racist explanation. This favouring can be seen by 
the structure of the contrast, in which the first part (that opposition is racist) is placed before 
the favoured argument (that opposition is due to economic reasons) to give the second part of 
the contrast pair more weight (Atkinson, 1984).  
In the following section we show how as well as the economic argument for opposing asylum a 
common theme in one of the focus groups (FG5) was that asylum may be opposed on religious 
grounds. In particular, this different religion is associated with a threat of terrorism. In this next 
extract we see a participant suggesting that people may be opposing asylum due to the religion 
of asylum seekers. 
2. It’s not racism; it’s about religion and terrorism 
Extract 4a: FG5 Religion, terrorism 
1. P1:   i think it is: because of (1.0) their religion where they’re from 
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2. SG:  rig[ht] 
3. P1:        [i d]o: think it counts 
4. SG:  okay 
5. P1:   not mE I DOn’t think like that but I know pe- a lot of people think like that 
6. SG:  so religio:n more than race maybe:? 
7. P1:   yeah  
8. P2:   I think at the 
9.    moment wi[th all the te]rrorist issues it’s reli:gion more [than race] 
As with previous extracts there is some hedging and a long pause before the main point is 
made and as in extract three ‘I think’ (4:1) allows for some potential distancing from the point 
being made. It is noteworthy that after mentioning religion as a possible cause of opposition to 
asylum that another reason ‘where they’re from’ (4:1) is suggested. The country of origin of 
asylum seekers is rarely given as a reason to oppose asylum (no other cases of this occur in this 
data corpus) and here seems to be closely associated with religion. Country of origin is given as 
an alternative reason to racism, despite the possible counter-argument that could be made 
that opposition of this kind may be deemed racist. The linking of religion and country of origin 
does suggest that a particular stereotype of asylum seekers (that of Muslims from the Middle-
East) is being used here (despite the evidence suggesting that many asylum seekers are from 
other countries and are not Muslim, see Home Office, 2008). Nevertheless, this route of 
argument is not pursued and P1 next refers to religion (4:6) only, five lines later. 
However following the interviewer’s continuer (4:4) P1 appears to backtrack somewhat and 
positions herself as someone commenting on the suggestion that opposition is based on 
religion and country of origin rather than holding the view personally. This can be seen through 
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the loud talk accompanying this denial (4:5) that suggests urgency on the part of the speaker to 
ensure that this position is not attributed personally to her. By saying that ‘a lot of people think 
that’ (4:5) P1 positions herself as a commentator rather than a participant in the debate and so 
both adds credibility to her claim and rhetorically dissociates herself from this view. The 
interviewer’s reformulation of this claim (4:6) is met with a confirmation from P1 (4:7) which 
suggests that this reformulation is accepted as fair. At this point P2 enters the discussion and as 
well as backing up P1’s position goes on to make an explicit link between religion and 
terrorism. Unlike P1 who dissociated herself from the position, P2 claims ownership of this 
point by saying ‘I think’ (4:8). The use of ‘at the moment’ (4:9) serves to place this situation in a 
particular timeframe which means that P2 can easily respond to any challenges that this has 
not always been the case and may not be the case again. ‘All the terrorist issues’ (4:9) is 
something of a gloss over a very dominant repertoire of the threat of terrorism and the war on 
terror (see Leudar et al., 2004). To be able to gloss such a significant repertoire shows that not 
only is this an appeal to common knowledge, but also that P2 orients to this knowledge as self 
evident, so that no attempt to qualify this point is needed. 
It is the ‘terrorist issue’ (4:9) that is used to account for how the religion of asylum seekers may 
currently be enough grounds to oppose asylum seeking to the UK. What is unsaid here is that 
the linking of religion to terrorism implicates only one religion: Islam. This therefore suggests 
that as well as expecting a common knowledge, cultural understanding of the ‘problem’ of 
terrorism, P2 also orients to the expectation that asylum seekers are seen as being Muslim, and 
most likely from the part of the world (‘where they’re from’ 4:1) associated with ‘the war on 
terror’ and terrorism; the Middle-East. While the literature shows that there are indeed many 
asylum seekers (and recognised refugees) from the Middle-East, it also shows that many 
asylum seekers are not from this region (e.g. Home Office, 2008), nor have any terrorist attacks 
been perpetrated by asylum seekers in the UK. Nevertheless, this point is not mentioned 
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throughout the focus group, which leaves the assumption that most asylum seekers are Muslim 
(and possible terrorist) unchallenged. 
Following on from this extract the focus group topic is diverted briefly before P2 continues this 
argument 15 lines later. This time P4 enters the conversation and builds the account of 
opposition to asylum being based on the threat of terrorism collaboratively with P2. 
Extract 4b: FG5 Religion, terrorism 
10.       P2:   I think religion is probably a bit of a (.) issue at the minute >but that’s< 
11.    more be[cause] of the terrorists [attacks] th[at ha]ve been going  
12.   P4:   [yeah ]      [mm::   ] 
13.   SG:             [right] 
14.   P2:  on [like  ] you know (0.8) sh- [(.) some (stewdies)] would be saying  
15.   P4:      [yeah]           [I think the (meed)  ] 
16.   P2:   muslim and the: li:ke (0.8) .hh °I don’t want 
17.     them° [>they’re gonna] be bombers<]  
18.   ?:             [((laughs))          ] 
19.   P4:              [they’re doing (.)            ] the media’s portrayed like every 
20.     muslim to be an extreme:ist 
21.   SG:  right 
22.   P4:  =and every like (.) sort of (.) that sort of religion to b:e: an an extreme:ist  
23.   SG:  ri:ght °okay° 
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24.   P4:   =and (.) that’s what people think when they hear (0.4) muslim and t- 
25.     um (0.4) like religions like that (0.3) they just think (.) extremist (.) 
26.    um (1.8) terrori:st 
At the start of this part of the extract P2 repeats her comment about religion based opposition 
to asylum being due on the threat of terrorism. This repeat uses a very similar structure to the 
earlier comment. Again ‘I think’ (4:10) is used and ‘at the minute’ (4:10) does the same work as 
‘at the moment’ (4:8/9) to suggest that this is a contemporary issue that has not, and may not, 
always be the case. Again this opposition is attributed to the threat of terrorism. While this 
statement does emphasise the ‘problematic’ status of Islam in contemporary Britain, it does 
have the effect of disclaiming that British people are opposed to foreigners or different 
religions without reason. Instead this statement suggests that they are only opposed to 
potential terrorists and that this opposition will only last as long as the terrorist threat does. 
This means that any hostility is not due to British opponents of asylum, but to terrorists. Such a 
strategy can work in a similar way to ‘differentiating the other’ (Lynn & Lea, 2003) in which 
potential (‘bogus’) asylum cheats are used to justify the opposition to all asylum seekers.  
P4 signals agreement with P2 (4:12) in overlap. P2 and P4 then speak together and build an 
account of what other people say (as with P1 above they are positioning themselves as 
commentators rather than participants in the debate). On line 16 the religion in question that is 
being opposed is explicitly named for the first time (‘Muslim’, 4:16). After the religion is named 
P2 offers her account with much delicacy. This can be seen by the long pause (4:16) and the 
quietly and quickly delivered words (4:16/17). While P2 displays delicacy, her comments are 
met with laughter. This laughter could suggest that this point is considered to be amusing, or 
perhaps shows that it is a delicate and contentious matter. Nevertheless, after this comment 
and the associated laughter P4 explains why people may be opposed to asylum seekers and 
18 
 
lays the blame directly with the ‘media’ (4:19) for linking Muslims with terrorism. P4 uses an 
extreme case formulation (4:19; Pomerantz, 1986) to criticise the media for exaggerating. This 
helps to construct the media as accountable for any hostility to asylum seekers by rendering 
people unable to dissociate Muslims from the notion of terrorism (4:24-26). 
After P4’s turn there is another 15 lines of talk in which P1 gives an account of an unspecified 
Muslim who allegedly had called for a mass immigration of ‘Asians’ into Britain so as to replace 
the culture of the country with an Asian one. After this, P2 completes her account by 
contrasting opposition to race with opposition to religion to show that opposition to asylum is 
not racist, but is based on the problems of religion and terrorism. 
Extract 4c: FG5 Religion 
27.       P2:   I don’t know it’s- (1.0) ↑do you call people ↓if you’re against >somebody’s 
28.     religion< is that being racialist? (0.2) that’s not being racist is it ‘cause 
29.     that’s not  
30.   P3:   =°prejudice I suppose° 
31.   P1:   myeah 
32.   P2:   because he- (.) I think (.) at this moment in ti::me the ma- (.) like (.)  
33.     there’d be quite a fe:w people if you had (.) a black christian person (.) or 
34.     a white muslim pers:o:n (0.4) >they’d be a lot more prejudicst< against 
35.    (.) the white muslim per[son (.) becau]se of the (.) current (.) social (.)  
36.   SG:        [right okay    ] 
37.   P2:  standing like 
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P2 seeks to give credibility to the idea that opposition to asylum is based on religion rather 
than race in two ways. First she seeks to give a formal name to this kind opposition. She 
suggests that it can be called racism, in the form of a rhetorical question (4:28), only to reject 
this term as inaccurate with the support of P3’s correction ‘prejudice’ (4:30), and P1’s 
agreement (4:31). Second, P2 builds a more detailed account where she contrasts religious 
opposition with racial opposition to highlight that any opposition to asylum is religiously 
motivated. Again, this is attributed to contemporary issues (4:32 and 35) which once more 
shows that this is a legitimate intolerance brought about by terrorists rather than any prejudice 
inherent in the British population. 
In this final extract we can see both economic and religious reasons for opposing asylum 
brought together under the umbrella of integration where asylum seekers are presented as 
incompatible with British society. 
3. It’s not racism; it’s about integration. 
Extract 5: FG5 Integration, taking our jobs, taking our women 
1. P3:   I’d- (.) I think it’s mainly to do with integra:tion which (.) does link with the  
2. P4:   =yeah 
3. P3:   =religion (0.4) [being int]egrated in society if it’s (.) .hh separate  
4. SG:               [right      ] 
5. P3:   everything’s separate: an then it seems like you’re just (.) coming in (.)  
6.    doing your own thing taking our jo:bs (.) taking (.) .hh like .hh el- even 
7.    (.) some: (.) might even think oh y’know taking our women kind of things: 
8.    some [men] might sa:y th[a::t you never know (.) um  ] ((laughs)) (0.7) 
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9. SG:             [right]  
10. ?:         [yeah yeah I can I can (      )  ] 
11. P3:   or whatever (0.7) so (0.8) I dunno th- they might come and (0.7) think >I  
12.    think it’s that’s< what it is integra:tio:n (.) mai:nly: [they’re not integrate:d] 
Ten lines after extract 4, P3 seeks to associate the issue of religion with integration. This can be 
seen with the emphasis on ‘does’ (5:1). P3 then supports this case for a lack of integration by 
way of a list which includes the asylum seekers doing their own thing, taking jobs and taking 
women. This account works to build the asylum seeking ‘other’ as particularly problematic. This 
listing of problems combined with the reference to ‘you’ (5:5) and ‘our’ (5:6) and ‘doing your 
own thing’ (5:6) shows that an ‘us and them’ distinction (or in this case separation 5:5), so 
common in talk about asylum seeking (Goodman, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003; Mehan, 1997; Van 
der Valk, 2003; van Dijk, 1993, 1997; Verkuyten, 2001, 2005) is present here. The reference to 
jobs shows the speaker drawing on the ‘economic reasons to oppose asylum’ repertoire 
identified above, however the ‘taking our’ (5:6) part of this suggests that the asylum seekers 
are actively damaging the existing population rather than this being a consequence of them 
being here1. 
P3 then takes this account even further by suggesting that it could be said that asylum seekers 
are even here to take the country’s women. This is a peculiar remark as it is made by a female 
participant, however the comment is presented as reported speech (signalled by ‘oh’ 5:7) and 
so not considered to be the speaker’s own words. P3 highlights that what she just said was 
quite extreme by shifting her footing (Goffman, 1981) to show that it is possible that men could 
say that. Her laughter after this further highlights the comical nature of such an extreme 
comment. After this laughter (which is not met with laughter or any comments from anyone 
                                                             
1 Asylum seekers are legally banned from working in the U.K. (Sales, 2002) 
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else in the group) there is a serious of long pauses and continuing terms (‘whatever’ and ‘so’ 
5:11) before P3 shows signs of faltering in this argument (‘dunno’ 5:11) and returning to the 
point about integration. While the point about taking ‘our’ women didn’t appear to support her 
argument about lack of integration this turn still functions to present asylum seekers as ‘other’ 
and as a threat to the British way of life. This seems to be consistent with other anti-asylum 
arguments that suggest that asylum can be damaging to British culture (Goodman, in press). 
This post functions to bring about a construction of asylum seekers as both an economic 
problem and as a threat to the country’s culture while denying that such opposition is racist. 
Conclusions 
This analysis has addressed explanations for opposing asylum seeking that are favoured over 
representing this opposition as racist. Three major arguments were identified as alternatives to 
racism: (1) that asylum is opposed for economic reasons (2) that asylum is opposed because 
asylum seekers are of a different religion and therefore may be terrorists and (3) that asylum 
seekers may not integrate into existing society. 
That opposition to asylum is constructed as due to economic reasons by participants has been 
identified in discursive analyses as being used in the media and by politicians (see Capdevila & 
Callaghan, 2008; Goodman & Speer, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003). What is of particular interest is 
that the economic argument is used here by students and is explicitly favoured at precisely the 
point at which it is suggested (by the interviewer's question) that opposition to asylum may be 
racist. This suggests that a repertoire of 'economic opposition to asylum' is utilised to produce 
'discursive deracialisation' (Augoustinos & Every, 2007, p.133) within the interaction. We have 
therefore shown that discursive deracialisation can be seen as a participant's strategy in 
interaction in talk about asylum. Nevertheless, a great deal of delicacy is displayed when 
participants use this argument which suggests that they are orienting to the controversial 
nature of the claim. While this appears to be a commonly used argument it is therefore by no 
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means taken for granted as common knowledge (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Speakers tended to 
present this position as part of a contrast structure in which the non-racist (favoured) 
argument was placed in the second part of the contrast to give it more rhetorical strength. 
Another notable strategy aimed at producing discursive deracialisation was the strategy of 
attributing opposition to asylum on religious grounds. In many ways this strategy is typical of 
discursive deracialisation. As Every and Augoustinos show 
exclusionary views and practices can be legitimated and warranted through the use of 
culture, rather than race, as a marker of difference. … In this culture-as-natural difference 
discourse, the Other is constituted as inferior in their cultural practices, attitudes and 
values, and as a threat to the dominant culture (2007, p.413) 
The linking of asylum seekers with terrorism has been shown to be made in the media (e.g. 
Leudar et al., 2008; Randal, 2003) and this analysis has shown that it is also used by 
undergraduate participants as an alternative - reasonable - explanation for opposing asylum. 
This claim is presented as belonging to other people rather than the speakers themselves 
which suggests some attempt by speakers to dissociate themselves personally with this view. 
The use of this strategy shows that the threat of terrorism is an important repertoire in 
contemporary society and that this threat is used to oppose contact with out-groups, even 
when these groups may not be directly involved in terrorism (as is the case with asylum 
seekers). This strategy also positions asylum seekers as particularly distinct from the British 'us' 
both religiously and culturally (which also shows that the issues of religion and culture are 
distinguished from race). This represents an extreme version of the 'us and them' dichotomy 
that has been shown to be common in asylum talk (Goodman, 2007; Lynn & Lea, 2003; Mehan, 
1997; Van der Valk, 2003; van Dijk, 1993, 1997; Verkuyten, 2001, 2005): here asylum seekers 
are potential terrorists who represent a threat to our safety. This is a strong rhetorical device 
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based upon the myth of the threat of terrorism posed by asylum seeking  which justifies a 
failure to help, and the harsh treatment of, asylum seekers.  
The final argument used as an alternative to racism in explaining opposition to asylum was that 
asylum seekers are unable to integrate into British society. This argument was closely linked 
with those based on the different religion of asylum seekers and the threat of terrorism they 
may bring. This again shows an orientation to what Every and Augoustinos called the 'culture-
as-natural discourse' (2007, p.413) and uses the 'us and them' dichotomy to represent asylum 
seekers as incompatible with 'us'. 
Another interesting finding of this analysis is that once again it is argued that it is easier for 
minorities than whites to make anti-asylum arguments. This shows an orientation to the 
criticisms of the ‘norm against prejudice’ (Billig, 1988, p.95) in which this norm is presented as 
unfair towards majority groups (Goodman, in press; van Dijk, 1992) which means that only 
minority groups can be seen to oppose asylum without the threat of being accused of racism 
(Goodman & Burke, in press). 
This analysis has shown that there appears to be a move towards a common knowledge 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) understanding that opposition to asylum is not based on racism, but 
on other - more reasonable - grounds, and in particular because of economic practicalities. We 
have shown, however, that discursive work is nevertheless required to bring about such a 
construction which suggests that there is still room for debate about this point. It does seem, 
however, that opposition to asylum in the main is oriented to as a reasonable (non-racist) 
outcome of economic scarcity; much to the detriment of people fleeing persecution. 
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